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Abstract
An extensive literature has analysed the economic effects of transition patterns in Central 
and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. With few recent exceptions, 
analysis of the impacts of speed and sequencing of reforms has not concerned the dynamics 
of income inequality. In this paper we analyse the heterogeneous effects of transition re-
forms on inequality by explicitly considering their speed and sequencing. To this aim we 
identify seven transition models in which the 27 countries considered can be classified. The 
dynamic panel econometric analysis for the period 1989–2006 reveals that balanced transi-
tion patterns, which favoured a coordination of reforms especially in specific fields, were 
relatively less pro-inequality. 
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1  Introduction 
A general feature accompanying transition of formerly planned economies has been a 
raise in economic and social inequality. Although some forms of disparities existed also 
before transition (Milanovic, 1998), the shift towards market economies allowed exist-
ing visible and hidden inequalities to develop, and new inequalities to unfold. Distribu-
tional patterns in the 90s for the Central and Eastern European and post-Soviet Union 
countries proceeded at a quite different pace, attaining (and in some cases stabilising at) 
diversified levels after two decades of reforms. 
The drivers of inequality are in general very difficult to discern since distributive 
outcomes are the converging point of the many economic, demographic and structural 
forces into play. This complexity is of course enhanced by the massive institutional and 
structural change occurred in formerly socialist countries. The aim of this paper is to 
investigate whether and to what extent inequality dynamics can be attributed to the dif-
ferent reform approaches adopted. 
An extensive literature has analysed the economic effects of alternative patterns of 
transition towards market economy. However, in cross-country analyses, the impacts on 
income inequality have received much less attention compared to growth performance. 
Distributional aspects in transition, on the other hand, have been largely and deeply 
analysed and discussed, either in theoretical terms or empirically. In this paper we ana-
lyse the effects of reforms on inequality explicitly considering their speed and sequenc-
ing. To this aim, we assembled a panel dataset of 27 transition economies from Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) for the years 1989–2006. 
Income inequality measures are regressed against a set of control variables and indica-
tors of speed and sequencing of transition reforms derived by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition scores. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide the conceptual 
and theoretical background of our study, reviewing the main antecedent attempts to 
identify, classify and measure the various patterns of transition implemented in (CEE) 
and in (FSU) countries (section 2.1). In section 2.2 we briefly report on the most impor-
tant and influential contributions on income inequality dynamics during transition. In OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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Section 3 we provide descriptive evidence on inequality in the countries and years con-
sidered and describe the approach adopted to identify the various models of transition. 
Section 4 presents the empirical model relating reform patterns to inequality, the 
econometric approach and the outcomes. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Theoretical and Empirical Background 
2.1 Transition Patterns: Speed and Sequencing of Reforms 
While economic and political theory was familiar with the causes and the processes of 
transformation of capitalist societies into centrally planned systems, the reverse direc-
tion of change has largely taken economists and policy makers by surprise. As a result, 
actual transition patterns at the beginning of the 90s turned out quite diversified and 
were classified by the early and subsequent extensive literature into two main groups 
which, under different labels, basically reflected the pace of reforms (e.g., Murrell, 
1992; Popov, 2000). However, as transition proceeded, scholars became increasingly 
aware that the emphasis on the speed of reforms only (gradualism – or incremental, ver-
sus shock therapy – or big bang approach) would have been a too narrow and limited 
perspective (Roland, 2000 and 2001), since transition involved many other dimensions, 
related to complementarity/substitutability of reforms, their possible reversibility in 
view of needed adjustments, and political economy sustainability (Marangos, 2005). 
Starting from mid-90s, the debate has indeed started to increasingly centre also upon 
which sequencing of reforms was more desirable, even though the focus on their speed 
remained largely prevalent especially in growth studies. We will refer here mainly to 
these contributions since we are not aware of papers directly considering the impact of 
speed and sequencing of reforms on income inequality. Among the very first contribu-
tions, Fischer et al. (1996) and de Melo et al. (1997) used a cumulative liberalisation 
index (averaging progress in price and trade liberalisation, privatisation and banking 
reforms) in growth regressions, concluding that more speedy reforms were beneficial to 
growth. The use of this index, which basically does not separate the effect of the reform 
levels and of earlier reforms, received various criticisms (e.g., Staehr, 2005). Subse-
quent attempts to provide more accurate measurement of the speed of reform were, for Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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example, Berg et al. (1999), Wolf (1999), Heybey and Murell (1999) and Godoy and 
Stiglitz (2006). We will consider this literature more in depth in section 3. Aspects re-
lated to sequencing were far less dealt with (Havrylyshyn, 2001), also due to the diffi-
culties to proxy it. Only a few studies addressed these aspects explicitly, for example by 
comparing the effects of aggregate and single reform indicators (Havrylyshyn et al., 
1998); including in the regressions interaction terms of reform indicators (Zinnes et al.,
2001); measuring bundling/unbundling of reforms with their standard deviation (Lora, 
2000); or by using principal component analysis to identify sets of reforms implemented 
simultaneously (Staehr, 2005). One recent paper directly measuring how the probability 
of reform progress in one area is affected by progress already achieved in other fields is 
Barlow and Radulescu (2005). 
Although we are not aware of studies explicitly considering the effects of reforms 
speed and sequencing on income inequality patterns, the vast literature on others aspects 
of transition inherently touches distributive aspects and provides useful insights. For 
example, in the optimal speed of transition (OST) literature (Aghion and Blanchard, 
1994; Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Boeri, 2000) it is the wages decline resulting from 
the shrinking of the public sector that busts the profit prospects of potential newcomers 
and their entry into the private sector. Therefore, the speed of transition drives the size 
of the unemployment pool and the extent of wages decline; at the same time, the final 
equilibrium, as well as the net distributive outcomes during transition, also depend on 
the countervailing role played by the social support granted to unemployed in the first 
place. Similarly, the literature supporting gradualism via political economy arguments 
in a median voter environment, maintains that reform patterns should also care to pre-
serve acceptable levels of social cohesion and to avoid excessive inequality, which are 
most likely to create aversion to further reforms, feed pressures for redistribution, or 
generate political instability (Roland, 2001). This latter argument implies that not only 
speed, but also an appropriate sequencing should be designed to avoid inequality out-
burst, which is likely to prevent further steps forward of the reform process, therefore 
envisaging the possible endogeneity of reforms with respect to inequality. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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2.2  Income Inequality in Transition 
Although at the early stages of transition inequality received relatively less attention 
compared with other aspects (Roland, 2001) an extensive literature has been developing 
on this field in more recent years. We only aim here at recalling the main contributions 
with empirical cross-country contents and those more relevant to the aims of the paper
1.
Undoubtedly, the first comprehensive work on the subject was the book by Milanovic 
(1998). Among many insights, his main general findings were that: (a) inequality in-
creased remarkably during transition but with significantly different patterns and rates 
across countries; (b) increasing wage inequality was everywhere the main driver of in-
come inequality surge; (c) private income sources other than wages contributed little to 
inequality with the exception of a few countries; (d) social transfers played a minor 
countervailing role, with pensions that were paradoxically pro-inequality in some coun-
tries of Central Europe and in especially in Russia. Similar outcomes were provided in 
Milanovic (1999). A comparably extensive work was that by Flemming and Mickle-
wright (2000), who equally concluded for a generalized increase of inequality during 
transition; however, while most of countries stabilized at OECD average levels (at the 
end of 90s), Russia and other former Soviet Union countries went far beyond. Both 
these works also emphasized the great difficulty in obtaining comparable data, and this 
explains the fact that, also in ensuing years, only a limited literature dealing with cross-
country analysis has developed. Among the most important ones, Grün and Klasen 
(2001) provide an international and intertemporal analysis of well-being during transi-
tion, accounting for distributive patterns. They conclude that well-being levels in the 
scrutinized countries fell sharply during transition since generalized output decline was 
accompanied by increasing income inequality. The same authors (Grün and Klasen, 
2011) also found that well-being levels after two decades of transition stabilized at lev-
els similar or lower than those under central planning. Another recent paper considering 
well-being rankings in European transition countries vis-à-vis the old EU members, but 
1 Comprehensive and reference theoretical models of inequality in transition can be found in Ferreira 
(1999) and Aghion and Commander (1999). An extensive empirical literature on inequality dynamics in 
single European or former Soviet Union countries has been emerging in the last decade. See Aristei and 
Perugini (2011) for a review. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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using a multidimensional approach and country specific estimates of inequality aversion 
parameters, is that by Aristei and Perugini (2010). As regards subjective well-being, 
Selezneva (2011) provides a comprehensive review about happiness and satisfaction 
studies on income, work and family life in transition countries. 
Ivaschenko (2002) finds that, during the 90s, development level was associated 
with higher inequality in Eastern Europe, but with lower inequality in former Soviet 
Union countries. Beyond hyperinflation and systemic change driven by liberalizations, 
privatizations and deindustrialization are found to raise income inequality throughout 
the whole transition region, as well as war episodes. The distinctive feature of the work 
by Mikhalev (2003) is instead the focus on the distributive consequences of the new 
capitalistic social structure, driven by assets and goods property, and professional posi-
tions. More recently, Mitra and Yemstow (2006) provide empirical evidence on the va-
riety of components, patterns and size of inequality growth, and summarizes the find-
ings of the existing literature into six drivers of inequality in transition: (i) wage de-
compression and growth of the private sector; (ii) restructuring and unemployment; (iii) 
changes in government expenditure and taxation; (iv) price liberalization, inflation and 
arrears; (v) asset transfer and growth of property income; (vi) technological change and 
globalization.
Hölscher (2006) finds that while in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland inequality 
remained relatively stable in the 90s, it increased remarkably in Russia, where in par-
ticular the share of profits declined as opposed to the share of transfers, the importance 
of wage having remained relatively stable. Emphasis is also posed on the possible   
role of informal economy on the true dynamics of inequality (on this point, see also 
Rosser et al., 2000). 
Lastly, we briefly report on three recent papers that explicitly deal with the dis-
tributive impact of policy measures. Giammatteo (2006) shows that state transfers and 
taxes played a vigorous and comparatively stronger role in Poland and Hungary during 
transition, allowing their governments to contain inequality during the most turbulent 
years. However, some components of state transfers (e.g., retirement benefits or child 
and family allowances) proved to be inequality enhancing. Ivanova (2007) provides OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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descriptive empirical evidence for Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria and points out that the 
weak social policies, which accompanied reforms strongly biased towards growth con-
cerns, led to a remarkable decline in socioeconomic equality. Milanovic and Ersado 
(2011) is in our knowledge the only attempt to directly link transition reforms to ine-
quality in a cross-country perspective. A panel approach (years 1990–2005, 26 formerly 
planned economies of the Soviet bloc) is employed to identify the effects exerted on 
decile income shares by progress in reforms towards full market economies, as meas-
ured by the EBRD transition indicators. The analysis reveals that in general reforms 
were strongly pro-rich and anti-poor. However, if the transition trajectories are consid-
ered separately, a statistically significant pro-inequality role is only played by large-
scale privatization and infrastructure reforms, whereas small-scale privatization seems 
beneficial for the income share of the bottom deciles. Various insights for future re-
search on inequality are drawn by the authors, the most intriguing ones being the impor-
tance of discriminating the various transition components and considering their possible 
interactions. Our attempt here is to develop this line of research. 
3  Inequality Dynamics in Transition and Reform Patterns 
In this section we first present a brief description of the data used and a snapshot on 
income inequality patterns during transition (3.1). Then we discuss the approach used to 
represent quantitatively the various transition patterns (3.2) and their expected effects 
on inequality (3.3). 
3.1  Data and Descriptive Analysis on Inequality Dynamics 
Our empirical analysis refers to 27 transition countries for the period 1989–2006.   
For descriptive purposes we classify these countries into the following groups: New  
EU Member Countries (NEUM), which joined the EU between 2004 and 2007; (b) 
Former Soviet Republics (FSR), which are full or associate members of the Common-
wealth of Independent States; (c) Western Balkan Countries (WBK) (see Table A1   
in the appendix for the list of countries and acronyms used). Our main data sources are: 
(i) the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), provided by the United Nations   Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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University – World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU – WIDER), 
for the Gini coefficient of income inequality (gini)
2; (ii) the World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) dataset, provided by The World Bank, for the macroeconomic and structural 
variables
3; and (iii) the Transition Indicators database, provided by the EBRD, for the 
variables describing progress of reforms in the various fields
4. In order to consider the 
effects of political and economic stability, we also included a dummy variable (war)
that is equal to 0 if the country, in a given year, was not at war and 1 otherwise
5. Too 
many missing values prevented the inclusion of other possible reform or institutional 
proxies (e.g., the OECD labour market institutions indicators). Although we address 
econometrically the problem of this missing information by exploiting the panel nature 
of our data, this should be kept in mind when interpreting the outcomes. Table A2 in the 
appendix lists the variables used, their abbreviations and source. 
Data for the Gini index in the countries considered for the years 1989 to 2006 are 
reported in Table A1. As a reference, average OECD countries Gini coefficient increased 
from 29.3% in the mid-80s to 31.3% in the mid-2000s, whereas for the western EU coun-
tries it increased from 27.7% to 29.3% (OECD, 2008). The NEUM countries at the outset 
of transition were characterized by inequality at around 20–25 Gini points, with the ex-
ception of the Baltic Countries, and experienced remarkably different rates of inequality 
increase. The Czech and the Slovak Republic, in particular, were able to keep their ine-
quality growth at a minimum; to a lower extent this was also the case for Hungary and 
2  The WIID dataset combines measures of inequality from a number of primary datasets   
and this usually poses comparability problems. In our case the source is, with a few exceptions,   
the Transmonee project, which assures an acceptable homogeneity of the data. More information at: 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ 
3 More information at: http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/ 
4  Progress in transition is measured against the standards of industrialized market economies, and   
refers to nine areas: Large Scale Privatization (LSP), Small Scale Privatization (SSP), Governance   
and Enterprise Restructuring (GER), Price Liberalization (PL), Trade and Foreign Exchange System 
(TFE), Competition Policy (CP), Banking Reform and Interest Rate Liberalization (BR), Securities   
Markets and Non-bank Financial Institutions (SFI), and Infrastructure (I). More information at 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm. We are aware of the limitations and dra-
wbacks of using EBRD indicators (see EBRD, 2010 and Besley et al. 2011); however, differently from 
de facto indicators,  they offer the advantage of completeness and full cross-country coverage over the 
whole transition period. 
5  The variable is provided by the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) and available at: 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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Slovenia. In the remaining countries income inequality rose more sharply, in a few 
cases exceeding 35% (Romania, Estonia and Lithuania) and approaching 40% in Latvia. 
In the FSR, with the only exceptions of Belarus and Ukraine, pre-transition ine-
quality was relatively higher and has been growing dramatically during the 90s, exceed-
ing 40% for most of the countries and approaching 50 Gini points for the Russian Fed-
eration, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. With the only exception of Belarus, ine-
quality levels in the FSR remain high in the final year available. 
Lastly, as far as the Western Balkan Countries are concerned, the uneven patterns 
of inequality probably also reflects the specific historical events of each country, which 
also affected heavily their data availability. However, in these countries, the tormented 
90s and the first half of the 2000s did not mean remarkable increases in inequality, 
which remained in 2006 at about 30% in Albania and Croatia, and below 40% in Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia. 
3.2  Identification of Transition Reform Patterns 
The EBRD indicators, largely used as measures of progress in transition, are usually col-
lapsed into one indicator, obtained as the unweighted average or the sum of the specific 
indices. This choice, which implies perfect substitutability between reform areas, relies on 
the high correlation between the indices and assumes that the single reform patterns pro-
gressed at the same speed. This view cannot be considered as satisfactory: correlation is 
indeed high, but far from being perfect (and ranges from 0.63 to 0.88) and if we look at 
the reform patterns for single countries, they are far from overlapping (see diagram A1 for 
some examples; diagrams for the remaining countries are available upon request). Many 
studies identify countries such as Russia or Poland as examples of shock therapy strate-
gies and Hungary and Slovenia as gradualist approached (e.g., Lavigne, 1999). However, 
transition patterns were indeed very country specific, and none of them can be at the  
end characterized as a full “shock therapy”. Lin (2005) uses Poland as an example in 
which although prices were liberalized, large scale enterprises privatisation lagged behind 
(p. 241). Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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Rather, EBRD data reveal that each country followed an own path of transition 
and highlight ex-post country-specific models of speed and sequencing of reforms. The 
two concepts (speed and sequencing) cannot be distinguished if one aims at considering 
the complexity of reform patterns since, from this perspective, speed in one dimension 
cannot be considered separately from what happened for the other ones. Of course a 
summary indicator of progress of reforms provides an idea of timing of the transition 
process, but a variety of possible combinations of single reforms may lay behind. The 
limited specific literature available provides insights into the inequality effects of single 
reforms (Milanovic and Ersado, 2011) emphasizing their effects on both wages and 
profits. Our contention is that their effect cannot be easily identified if each single re-
form is not considered in connection with the other ones. For example, privatization 
processes are generally expected to drive inequality upwards, via creation of unem-
ployment pools and increase in wage dispersion (Milanovic, 1998 and 1999; Ivanova, 
2007). However, this effect will be lower in those context in which new entries of busi-
nesses is relatively easy and therefore partially able to offset unemployment; this, in 
turn, depends on the competition policy implemented and on the development of finan-
cial markets. Provided that transition increased inequality, our concern here is to find 
out whether different speeds and sequencings of reforms favoured a relatively stronger 
acceleration of inequality, or not. 
As already mentioned, the only previous attempt to consider the inequality effects 
of transition reforms in a cross-country perspective is Milanovic and Ersado (2011) 
panel analysis. However, they simply use the 9 EBRD indicators jointly in their regres-
sions (with a serious threat of multicollinearity, not dealt with in the econometrics), and 
do not address explicitly speed and sequencing aspects. This is instead done by Staehr 
(2005), but in order to assess transition reforms effects on growth. In this study speed 
and sequencing are kept separate, which is questionable for the reasons explained ear-
lier: in addition also the empirical approach to represent the sequencing seems unsatis-
factory. He indeed carries out principal component analysis on 8 EBRD indicators and 
derives 8 principal components; the first one, which explains nearly 80% of the vari-
ance, is interpreted as the indicator of general progress of reforms. The seven remaining OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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ones are interpreted as sequencing pattern, according to their correlation with EBRD 
indices. Due to their low explanatory power and ambiguous interpretation, this ap-
proach seems far from being optimal. 
In this work, in order to detect similarities across the countries considered in 
terms of co-movements and synchronies/asynchronies between reforms, we first iden-
tify the progress in transition in each reform dimension over a number of sub-periods 
(arbitrarily set at 4), interpreted as subsequent transition phases. The outset of transition 
(T0) is set  in the year before the first EBRD indicator departed from 1 in each country
6.
The progress in reforms is identified through the levels of each EBRD score in the five 
points over time (T0 to T4), which define the transition period. Once the 27 (countries) x 
45 (9 EBRD dimensions x 5 time points) matrix is obtained, we implement a cluster 
analysis in order to detect possible similarities between countries in terms of move-
ments of EBRD indicators in the different phases of transition. This approach allows 
considering simultaneously the speed of each reform dimension and its temporal inter-
relation with the others. Methodologically, we use a combined approach by employing 
both hierarchical and non-hierarchical methods and obtain a optimal partition into seven  
clusters
7. Each of them provides a different profile of transition/sequencing pattern   
(Figure 1). 
6 The transition indicators range from 1 to 4.33 (or 4+), with 1 representing little or no change from a 
rigid centrally planned economy and 4.33 representing the standards of an industrialised market eco-
nomy. The choice of using the “transition”, instead of the calendar, time is not unusual in the specific 
literature about speed and sequencing of reforms (see, e.g., Berg et al., 1999), and in our opinion is 
strongly preferable. The duration of the first three periods is 5 years: since the beginning of transition 
varied between countries, the length of the last period is shorter for latecomers, since our time span ends 
in 2006. EBRD data are available starting from 1989, when some countries had already undertaken some 
reforms and showed higher than one scores. For them (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia) T0 was set in 1989. Similarly, T0 was set 
in 1989 for Albania, Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Russian Federation and Slovak Republic, since 
the first EBRD indicators movement was recorded in 1990. T0 is instead 1990 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; and 1992 for 
Turkmenistan. 
7 We first implement the cluster analysis using the Ward linkage method and obtain a seven clusters parti-
tion using the usual dendrogram inspection and cluster cutting rules. Then we check the stability of these 
outcomes with the K-means method, setting the number of clusters to 7 and using the Ward-clusters cen-
troids as seeds. This second analysis provides a partition of the countries identical to the previous one, 
confirming the stability of the hierarchical clustering. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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Figure 1: Transition Speed and Sequencing: EBRD Scores Changes in the Four Phases
of Transition 
Cluster 1 
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia
Cluster 2 
Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania
Cluster 3 
Croatia, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia
Cluster 4 
Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Armenia, Georgia
Cluster 5 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan
Cluster 6 
Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, Ukraine
Cluster 7 
Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina
Notes:
LSP: Large Scale Privatization; 
SSP: Small Scale Privatization; 
GER: Governance and Enterprise Restructuring; 
PL: Price Liberalization; 
TFE: Trade and Foreign Exchange System; 
CP: Competition Policy;
BR: Banking Reform and Interest Rate Liberalization; 
SFI: Securities Markets and Non-bank Financial Institutions; 
I: Infrastructure.OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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A first important piece of information emerging from the cluster analysis is the 
polarization of the new Central European EU members and the Baltic countries into two 
groups (1 and 2), with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania classified in cluster 5 
along with Albania, Georgia and Armenia. All the remaining FSU countries are in clus-
ters 4 and 6, and those of former Yugoslavia in groups 3 and 7. 
3.3  Models of Transition: Discussion and Expected Impacts on
Inequality 
Clusters one and two contain all the Central and Eastern European countries which 
joined the EU in 2004, plus the Baltic countries. Cluster 1 includes the Czech Republic, 
the Slovak Republic and Estonia, which in fact had a very similar pattern of transition 
as revealed by the EBRD data, with a fast pace of reforms being implemented early in 
all fields simultaneously (with some gradualism in infrastructure reforms only). This 
suggests that the implementation of those reforms (in particular privatizations, enter-
prise restructuring, price liberalization) typically associated to increasing inequality via 
shrinking of the state sector, unfolding of unemployment and wage decompression, 
marched in step with other dimensions which may have played a counteracting role on 
inequality. We refer in particular to progress in competition policy which, along with 
exposure to international competition (TFE), may have prevented the formation of mo-
nopolistic positions or eroded the existing ones; to the early development of financial 
and banking sectors, which may have favoured new entries into the most dynamic sec-
tors and therefore the creation of employment and the improvement in competitive con-
ditions (lower prices, lower rents and profits). Progress in development of financial 
markets is also usually expected to be pro-equality (Li et al., 1998), increasing the pos-
sibility of worse-off agents to undertake investments (first of all education), which 
could drive upwards their relative income position. In other words, this balanced ap-
proach may have helped, comparatively to other reforms patterns (see below), in con-
taining the unavoidable adverse distributive effects of transition. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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Cluster 2 (Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania) is similar to the previously  
described one in the sense that various reforms dimensions (SSP, GER, PL, TFE, BR) 
remarkably progressed in the initial period. Some other reforms, such as large- 
scale privatization, securities and non-banking financial sectors intermediation,   
and especially competition policy, were instead implemented more smoothly compared 
to cluster 1. 
Cluster 3 groups three countries which, at the very beginning of the 90s, already 
showed progress towards market-based economic systems in important institutional   
dimensions, particularly price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange systems and   
the scale of small firms privatisation. From this point of view, some distributive effects  
of transition may have unfolded during the late 80s and partly absorbed at the beginning  
of the period considered. This is confirmed by the relatively high Gini coefficients   
for Croatia and Macedonia in 1989 (see table A1). In the ensuing years, reforms   
have gradually progressed in basically all fields, reaching advanced stages at the end of 
the period considered with the only exceptions of enterprise restructuring and competition 
policy. In summary, this represents a gradual approach which was still under completion  
in 2006. 
The pattern of transition revealed by the fourth group of countries (Albania, Arme-
nia, Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania) is characterized by a very fast price and trade and 
foreign exchange liberalization during the first stage of transition, accompanied by only a 
weak progress in competition policy, large enterprises privatization, firm restructuring and 
financial sectors development. In the following phases, reforms proceeded smoothly in all 
fields, even though competition policy, enterprise restructuring and development of non-
banking financial institutions were still not completed in 2006. This could be identified as 
a model that allowed, at the early stages of transition, the owners of the gradually privat-
ized small and medium enterprises to take advantage of price liberalization, without suf-
fering too much the forces of competition (weak competition policy and poor develop-
ment of banking and financial markets, which did not encourage new entries). A poor 
initial development of financial markets may also have reduced the emergence of further 
competitive pressures. This approach may have favoured, ceteris paribus, the positions of OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
14
the few who were able to take advantage of monopolistic power in the small private sec-
tors. At the same time, the gradual shrinking of the state sector (slow privatization and 
enterprise restructuring) may have smoothed wages decompression in the initial stage of 
development, partially compensating the rise in inequality. 
Cluster 6, which includes the Russian Federation and other FSU countries describes 
a transition picture similar to group 4. However, some reform dimensions, namely compe-
tition policy and banking sector development proceed more slowly and at the end of the 
period were much further from being completed. In addition, across the whole period, 
progress in privatisations and enterprise restructuring was remarkably weak. 
Cluster 5 puts together countries of the FSU in which transition was still lagging 
behind at the end of the period considered. The only steps forward were undertaken in 
price and trade liberalisation and in small scale privatisation. Other dimensions of reforms 
were instead, still at the end of the period considered, not far from the starting point. 
Lastly, clusters 7 includes countries that for various reasons underwent important 
transition discontinuities, related to war episodes and political instability. Progress in 
reforms was quite uneven across the various fields, with the exceptions of price and 
trade liberalisation; a certain advancement in the other dimensions was only imple-
mented in the last period considered. 
4  Speed and Sequencing of Reforms and Inequality: Empirical 
Evidence
In this section we show the approach used to test empirically the impact of reform pat-
terns on inequality. In paragraph 4.1 we discuss how the information about transition 
approaches derived in the previous section are included in the empirical model and de-
scribe the other control variables considered. Section 4.2 illustrates the econometric 
methods, while in Section 4.3 the results obtained are presented and discussed. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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4.1  The Empirical Model: Reform Related Variables and Other 
Control Variables 
As far as the information about reform patterns is concerned, we include in the regres-
sions a summary indicator of transition (named EBRD and computed as usual in the 
literature averaging the 9 transition indicators), along with the interaction variables ob-
tained as the product of EBRD and the dummy variables (CL1, ..., CL7) associated to 
the seven speed/sequencing models identified. The interpretation of the six interaction 
terms simultaneously introduced in the regression is straightforward: each of them 
represents the additional specific (negative or positive) effect produced by a certain pat-
tern of reforms on inequality compared to the reference group (the sixth model/cluster). 
The identification of the reference group is of course arbitrary and uninfluential on the 
outcomes: the choice of cluster 6 is motivated by the fact that it includes the Russian 
Federation and is therefore an informative benchmark case. 
Along with the variables representing reforms speed and sequencing, we obvi-
ously include a set of controls accounting for the remaining possible factors affecting 
inequality during transition. The choice of these explanatory variables and their ability 
to represent the intended effects are severely limited by data availability. For example, a 
crucial role might have been played by the approach followed to implement privatisa-
tion processes, an aspect not captured by the EBRD data and difficult to include in our 
cross-country approach. Following Milanovic and Ersado (2011) we included among 
the regressors: the growth rate of the economy (growth), inflation (inflation), govern-
ment spending as a share of GDP (govshare), industry structure (agrshare), and a con-
trol for war episodes (war).
Deriving expectations about the effects of these variables on inequality is a   
difficult task in general and in particular when specific time periods (such as transition) 
are considered. For example, the effects of growth clearly depend on the type of growth 
that has taken place (neutral, relatively more pro-poor or pro-rich) and the existing  
literature is controversial. Results from Milanovic and Ersado (2011) and Kimenyi 
(2006) support the idea that growth was pro-inequality, even though the absolute in-OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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come levels of the poor increased. Other studies provide opposite outcomes (e.g., Ivan-
schenko, 2002; Verme, 2006). 
Both the specific (e.g., Milanovic and Ersado, 2011; Ivanschenko, 2002) and non-
specific (Bulir, 2001) literature on transition supports the idea that high inflation increases 
inequality, since worse-off people are less able to protect themselves from prices growth. 
However, the empirical evidence is mixed (see Galli and van der Hoeven, 2001, for a re-
view). The countervailing (inequality-reducing) force – i.e., inflation pushing upwards 
wage earners into higher tax brackets –, however, may not be too powerful in the case of 
transition countries. This is not only because tax evasion has been very high, but also be-
cause progressivity in tax structures is relatively weak (Aristei and Perugini, 2010). In our 
case the inflation variable is also a control for the pace and strength of the stabilization 
policy imposed externally (i.e., by World Bank and International Monetary Fund). 
Govshare is instead used to control for the possible cushioning effect provided by 
government spending and welfare state provisions. A negative relationship of Govshare
is expected considering the available literature (e.g., Keane and Prasad, 2002), even 
though for some countries social transfers were found to increase market income ine-
quality (Milanovic, 1998). Our indicator is too general to capture the direct effects of 
social transfers. However, higher government spending may also correspond to an ag-
gregate demand stimulus, often beneficial to low-skilled sectors (e.g., construction in-
dustry), and this may also represent a buffer to widening inequality. 
We also include in the analysis an indicator of the industry structure (agrshare) in 
order to account for the structural change not already captured by the other variables 
(reforms, growth, macroeconomic developments), but which may control, for example, 
for demand driven factors, such as the industry mix changes related to unconstrained 
consumer preferences. The control for civil wars (war) is expected to impact positively 
on inequality. 
A final set of control variables accounts for the differences in the characteristic 
and methods used in the different surveys from which inequality measures are derived. 
They are basically dummy variables controlling for the survey (i) using persons rather 
than households as units of analysis (Dpers); (ii) calculating inequality on the basis of Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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income, gross earnings (Dearn), or consumption (Dcons); (iii); using equivalence scales 
(Deqs) or not; (iv) and covering the whole population (Dpop) or not.
The inclusion of these control variable, along with time-specific effects and the 
use of a panel approach, should assure correct identification of the effects of the reform 
patterns, which remain the focus of the paper. 
4.2. Econometric Methods 
In order to assess the impact of transition reforms on income inequality we consider the 
following dynamic model:  
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      [1] 
where subscripts i, t and j refer to countries, years and clusters, respectively (i = 1, …, 
27; t = 1989, ..., 2006; j = 1, …, 7); i   and  t   are the country and the time specific ef-
fects and  it   the error terms. The acronyms indicate the variables as described in the 
previous sections and in Table A2. 
The dynamic specification [1] allows accounting for the fact that within-country 
income inequality is characterized by high inertia and can be viewed as a time-
persistent phenomenon (see, among others, Mookherjee and Ray, 2003). However, the 
presence among the right-hand side variables of  ,1 it gini 	 , which is correlated with the 
composite error  , () ii t   , leads to inconsistent parameter estimates also when country 
heterogeneity is accounted for by means of conventional fixed- or random-effects esti-
mators (Baltagi, 2001). Moreover, specification [1] can be characterized by the presence 
of other endogenous regressors and reverse causality issues. A large body of literature 
has analysed the effect of inequality on growth pointing out that a possible problem of 
reverse causality may arise. Although the specific features of transition (namely the 
output dynamics driven by structural and systemic changes) suggest that such a possi-
bility can be ruled out (Ivanschenko, 2002), a recent study has provided support for ine-
quality being detrimental for growth in transition countries (Sukiassyan, 2007). Simi-OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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larly, a concern of inverse direction of causality may arise between transition reforms 
and inequality, as emphasised by political economy literature: in transition (see section 
2.1) distributive patterns may have affected the pace of reforms. However, other authors 
(e.g., Milanovic and Ersado, 2011) emphasise that transition dynamics was in most 
cases dictated from outside (e.g., by WB or IMF constrains) and that therefore the role 
of inequality could be considered irrelevant. Lastly, concerns of reverse causality can be 
raised, as already discussed, with respect to the link between economic inequality and 
government spending. 
To deal with all these issues simultaneously, Generalized-Method-of-Moments 
(GMM) estimation techniques can be employed. Firstly, the first-difference GMM estima-
tor proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which is based on first-differencing the re-
gression equation to eliminate the country-specific effect and uses lagged dependent vari-
ables as instruments, can be considered. For the aim of the present analysis, the main issue 
of using this estimator is related to the specific nature of inequality persistency: the cross-
sectional variation embodies a large part of the information since within-country inequal-
ity is quite persistent. In this respect, although the first-difference GMM estimator allows 
controlling for possible measurement errors, country-specific heterogeneity and endoge-
neity bias, it does not exploit the variation in levels. Thus, ignoring cross-sectional varia-
tion may affect the precision of the estimates and give rise to estimation biases, especially 
if most of the variation in the data is due to cross-country differences
8. Moreover, as 
pointed out by Blundell and Bond (1998), the lagged levels of the explanatory variables 
are weak instruments for the variables in differences when explanatory variables are per-
sistent
9.
The system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
allows to address these shortcomings, exploiting the cross-country variation in the data. In 
the system-GMM approach specifications in first-differences and in levels are combined. 
8 Deininger and Squire (1996) and Li et al. (1998) show that in non-transition countries most of the varia-
tion in inequality (close to 90%) is usually due to variation across countries. For transition economies the 
time dimension is more relevant, but cross-country variability still remains a substantial source of the 
variation in the period considered. 
9 Bond et al. (2001) show that in small samples such weak instruments issue further translate into a large 
finite sample bias. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
19
First-differencing eliminates the fixed effect in the model and controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity and time-invariant measurement errors, while adding the original equation 
in levels preserves the cross-country dimension, which is lost when only the first differ-
enced equation is estimated. The system GMM estimator uses internal instruments (i.e., 
lagged values of the endogenous explanatory variables) and thus requires a more stringent 
set of restrictions than the difference GMM. The equations in levels are, in fact, instru-
mented with the lagged first differences of the corresponding explanatory variables and, in 
order to consider these additional moments as valid instruments for levels, the identifying 
assumption that past changes of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with current 
errors in levels is required (Roodman, 2009). If the moment conditions are valid, Blundell 
and Bond (1998) show that the system GMM estimator performs significantly better than 
the first difference GMM estimator. The validity of the moment conditions can be tested 
by means of the test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958) and Hansen 
(1982) and by testing the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the error 
term. Furthermore, the validity of the additional moment conditions associated with the 
level equation can be tested with the difference Sargan/Hansen test. 
Specification [1] can be further extended by introducing lagged regressors to control 
for the existence of a time persistent relationship between income inequality and some po-
tential endogenous regressors, like GDP growth and government spending. We then obtain: 
,, 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
00
6
5, , , ,
1
qq
it i t it k it k it k it k it
kk
it it j it j it
j
gini gini growth inflation govshare agrshare
war EBRD EBRD CL









    
   


         [2] 
In the application, due to data constraints, we will include only one lag of growth and 
govshare (i.e., 2k 
 3k 
 0 for k 1) as additional regressors. This also provides a robust-
ness check for the empirical model as it allows to verify whether the inclusion of additional 
lagged controls substantially changes empirical results.  
System GMM estimation requires several specification choices. In particular, 
given the structure of our panel, in which N is only slightly larger than T, we use the OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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one-step estimator
10 and correct the standard errors to take account for small-sample 
bias and heteroschedasticity, by applying the Huber and White robust variance estima-
tor. Furthermore, Roodman (2009) discusses the problem of the overfitting bias caused 
by instrument proliferation in dynamic panels. In fact, system GMM uses all available 
instruments and the number of instruments increases quadratic to the number of time 
points. To overcome this issue, we use a combined strategy obtained by collapsing in-
struments (i.e., creating one instrument for each variable and lag distance only, with 0 
substituted for any missing values) and restricting the number of lags used as instru-
ments. By doing this the number of instruments used turns to be invariant in T.
As in most empirical studies on inequality, the estimation of models [1] and [2] is 
based on an unbalanced and unequally spaced panel dataset, described in Section 3.1. It is 
worth remarking that, although in the empirical application we have aimed at properly 
addressing the main issues arising from the structure of the dataset, all the data limita-
tions discussed should be kept in mind in interpreting the results. In particular, the use of 
a panel of unequally spaced spells, while allowing to keep the sample size reasonable 
high, could lead to an over representation of countries with a large number of observation 
and to inconsistent estimates if one period in the theoretical model has to perfectly corre-
spond to a certain time span in empirical data (Tamm et al., 2007). 
4.3. Outcomes and Interpretations 
Outcomes of the estimation of equations [1] and [2] are reported in Table 1. These specifi-
cations (as well as all the remaining ones presented) include time-specific effects and con-
trols for the features of the surveys from which inequality measures are obtained, whose 
estimated coefficients are not reported. In the estimations we treat growth, the share of 
government spending on GDP and transition reform index as endogenous variables. The 
instruments set used includes: levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods and 
further lags until four for the differenced equation; and explanatory variables in first differ-
10 As pointed out by Roodman (2009), in the two-step variant the number of elements to be estimated for 
the optimal weighting matrix is quadratic in the number of instruments and quartic in T. Moreover, the 
optimal weighting matrix has a rank of N at most and therefore, if the number of instruments exceeds N,
it is singular and the two-step estimator can be computed only by means of a generalized inverse of the 
weighting matrix, which significantly affects the asymptotic efficiency of the two step estimator. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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ences lagged one period for the level equation. The first two columns of Table 1 show es-
timation results for the dynamic model [1], while the last two present the estimates of the 
augmented specification [2], which includes further lagged regressors. All the specifica-
tions pass the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, the test for the overall signifi-
cance of the regression and the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation
11. As it can be 
noticed comparing the two sets of estimates, the lagged values of growth and govshare
have no statistically significant impact on income inequality
12, while the significance of all 
the other coefficients remains unchanged (with the only exception of inflation) and their 
size substantially unaltered. Since the two countries belonging to cluster 7 (Serbia and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina) represent very peculiar cases, we also tested the robustness of our 
results to their exclusion. Estimations reported in table A3 in the appendix highlight that 
the outcomes presented in table 1 have high stability. 
A first remarkable piece of information emerging from the outcomes is the positive 
and highly significant effect of the lagged dependent variable, which is a clear-cut indica-
tion and confirmation of the high persistence of income inequality and of the appropriate-
ness of a dynamic approach. The results related to the control variables reveal that both 
govshare and growth have a negative impact on inequality. This suggests that higher gov-
ernment shares of GDP may have played a buffer role towards the inequality generated and 
fed by other forces. Similarly, the results for GDP growth support the idea that output 
growth has been relatively more pro-poor (or that output collapse affected relatively more 
the better-off segments). The industry structure variable (agrshare) is significant and the 
positive effect suggests that, for those countries in which de-industrialization took place 
more intensively, the effects on the labour market hit the poor relatively more. Also the 
dummy variable war is significant and, in line with the findings of Ivaschenko (2002), sup-
ports the evidence that civil conflicts and war are associated with rising income inequality. 
11 Estimations consistency requires that the error term must be serially uncorrelated. If  , it   are serially 
uncorrelated, then  , it    are correlated with  ,1 it  	  , but they will not be correlated with  , it k  	   for  2 k  .
Thus if the model is correctly specified, we expect to reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocor-
relation and to not reject the hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation. 
12 The Wald tests for the joint significance of the two lagged regressors are equal to 
2
(2) 0.32  
  (p-value = 
0.8520) and 
2
(2) 2.17  
  (p-value = 0.3377) for the specifications reported in columns 3 and 4, respectively. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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On the other hand, inflation (inflation) is prevalently non-significant; this is contrary to the 
evidence provided by Milanovic and Ersado (2011) and Bhattacharya et.al. (2005), but in 
line with other empirical findings (Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999; Nikoloski, 2010). 
Lastly, it is worth remarking that time dummies are jointly significantly different 
from zero and, among the variables controlling for the surveys differences, Dearn and
Dpers proved to be steadily significant. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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Table 1: The Effect of Transition Reforms on Inequality: Dynamic GMM Models
Dynamic model      Dynamic model 
GMM-SYS      GMM-SYS 












 (–2.37)  (–2.77)  (–1.97)  (–2.88) 
Growth(t–1) –  –  0.012  –0.030 






 (–2.80)  (–3.10)  (–2.43)  (–2.94) 
Govshare(t–1) –  –  0.041  0.106 






 (4.47)  (3.71)  (4.37)  (3.80) 
Inflation –0.960
** –0.257  –0.785 –0.150 












 (2.84)  (3.78)  (2.94)  (4.50) 
EBRD
*CL1 –  –2.820
*** –  –3.393
***
   (–4.52)    (–5.26) 
EBRD
*CL2 –  –2.641
*** –  –3.010
***
   (–4.60)    (–5.22) 
EBRD
*CL3 –  –2.020
*** –  –2.337
***
   (–4.66)    (–5.25) 
EBRD
*CL4 –  –1.478
*** –  –1.458
***
   (–4.13)    (–3.91) 
EBRD
*CL5 –  1.709
*** –  2.202
***
 (2.20)   (2.58) 
EBRD
*CL7   1.096
*   1.238
**
   (1.79)    (2.13) 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
[joint significance]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.004]  [0.000] 
Controls for survey differences  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Obs.  269  269  253  253 
Wald test  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
A-B AR(1) test  –4.04  –4.44  –4.12  –3.77 
 [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
A-B AR(2) test  –0.13  –0.01  –0.68  –0.96 
 [0.898]  [0.991]  [0.532]  [0.335] 
Sargan over-identification test  13.30. (12)  10.45 (13)  18.90 (14)  17.25 (15)
 [0.347]  [0.657]  [0.169]  [0.304] 
Notes:  
t statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets. 
A-B AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first- and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
* p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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Turning to the analysis of the effects of reforms on inequality, the indicator sum-
marizing transition reforms (EBRD) has a positive and significant impact on inequality, 
revealing that the reforms associated with the transition process, once fundamental mac-
roeconomic factors are controlled for, led to an increase in income inequality. However, 
the main interest here is the analysis of the different patterns of reforms speed and se-
quencing, which we conjecture to have heterogeneous impacts on inequality. In particu-
lar, in columns 2 and 4 we present the results obtained by including interactions be-
tween the average EBRD index and dummies for groups of countries as identified by 
the cluster analysis. The estimated coefficients of these interaction variables should be 
interpreted as the difference in the average impact of reforms on inequality with respect 
to the omitted group (cluster 6), which includes the Russian Federation. 
Results reveal remarkable heterogeneity in the estimated effects of reform ap-
proaches on inequality. First of all, the impact of reforms was significantly less pro-
inequality in the countries identified with clusters 1 and 2, in which the various transi-
tion dimensions marched relatively more in step. This could be interpreted as empirical 
evidence of the countervailing role hypothesised for specific reforms (financial sectors 
development, competition policy, exposure to competitive pressures) implemented si-
multaneously with those typically inequality enhancing. Also the difference in the coef-
ficients size between the two groups addresses towards this interpretation, since the 
stronger inequality-curbing role of reforms in the countries of cluster 1 may be con-
nected to the relatively more coordinated timing of reforms in competition policy and 
financial sector (with respect to other transition dimensions and compared to cluster 2). 
The evidence of such a remarkable role of reform patterns in containing inequality par-
ticularly in the Czech and the Slovak Republic is, in our opinion, a distinctive outcome 
of our study, since it helps in shedding light on the causes of the surprisingly small rise 
in inequality observed in these countries during transition. 
Results also indicate that the countries belonging to cluster 3 undertook a reform 
approach relatively more pro-inequality compared to early EU members and Baltic 
countries, but still weaker compared to the benchmark group. We have already com-
mented on the fact that in the countries classified in cluster 3 some distributive effects Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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could have unfolded before the beginning of the period considered here as a result of 
privatisations and liberalisations previously implemented; afterwards, the resulting un-
balanced reform pattern could have produced distributive outcomes more unequal com-
pared to those in clusters 1 and 2. 
The transition model identified with cluster 4 is the one most similar to bench-
mark group (number 6); and confirms the stronger pro-inequality effects of reforms 
compared to the first three clusters. This could be justified with the remarkably weaker 
and later role played by some reform dimensions (namely financial sector and competi-
tion policy development), as explained in section 3.3. However, the transition impact of 
this approach is still significantly different and lower compared to the benchmark case. 
This might depend on the fact that in Russia, and in the remaining countries classified in 
cluster 6, the possibly inequality-compensating reforms proceed even more slowly and 
at the end of the period were much further from being completed. In addition, across the 
whole period, progress in privatisations and enterprise restructuring was really weak 
and this favoured the well-known stagnation of large sections of the economy in low-
productivity/low-wage traps, not triggering any dynamism of the private sector which 
has normally compensated, in later stages of transition, the initial rise in inequality as-
sociated to entering into market systems. 
Clusters 5 and 7 include the countries whose transition patterns produced inequal-
ity effects stronger than the reference group. As discussed earlier, the former puts to-
gether countries in which transition is still lagging behind and is almost exclusively 
identified with price and trade liberalisation; the interpretation proposed to explain the 
strong pro-inequality effect of transition for the countries of cluster 6 are reinforced 
here, since no compensating institutional dimensions seems to be entered into force yet. 
The positive sign of the coefficient associated to cluster 7 could be interpreted in a simi-
lar vein, but adding that also social and political instability during the transition process 
may have played a role. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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5  Final Remarks 
This paper is an attempt to measure the effects of different models of transition on income 
inequality. The specific original contribution of the paper lies on the identification of 
common patterns of transition, defined on the basis of the speed of reform of each dimen-
sion and on the temporal structure of their implementation. One intermediate outcome of 
our analysis is that patterns of transition towards a market economy were strongly diversi-
fied across countries, both in terms of speed and sequencing of reforms. Consequently, the 
shock therapy/gradualism juxtaposition can be only considered as a conceptualization 
useful to providing reference points, whereas the actual reform patterns always implied a 
complex mix of speed and timing of the single reforms components. 
Using a cluster analysis on the dynamics of each of the 9 EBRD transition indica-
tors over four phases of transition, we were able to identify seven different model of 
transition. These are actual transition patters occurred in formerly planned economies, 
as revealed ex-post by progress in reforms observed during the 90s and the first half of 
the years 2000. Our econometric results provide evidence that transition reforms in gen-
eral have significantly increased income inequality and this corroborates the existing 
empirical and theoretical literature. Our original result is that different patterns of transi-
tion affected inequality at different strengths, in the sense that some model of transition 
favoured relatively more an increase in inequality, while others did less. In particular, 
transition was relatively more pro-inequality when price and trade liberalizations and 
privatization were not accompanied by progress in competition policy and development 
of financial markets, which lagged behind or were implemented in later stages. From 
this point of view (i.e., ability to keep inequality growth relatively low), the transition 
patterns of most of the countries of central and Eastern Europe can be considered more 
successful compared to those of the Former Soviet Republics and of the Western Balkan 
countries. Our outcomes suggest that more balanced and coordinated transition ap-
proaches were relatively more able in restraining the unavoidable rise in inequality as-
sociated to giving up central planning. Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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From this point of view, this study contributes to the debate on the most desirable 
patterns of transition, which has been so far almost completely confined to their effects 
on growth. However, on the policy side, if income inequality affects subsequent growth 
in some respect (positively or negatively), as emphasized by a very extensive literature, 
this side effect of transition cannot be neglected. Especially if, as recently shown with 
specific reference to transition countries (Sukiassyan, 2007), higher inequality may be 
harmful for growth. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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Appendix
Table A1: Inequality in Transition Countries (Gini index, 1989–2006) 




Armenia  ARM  –  –  29.6 35.5 36.6 32.1 38.1 42.0  –  –  –  48.6  –  35.9 47.4 45.5 43.4 40.0 
Azerbaijan  AZE  30.8 34.5  –  36.1  –  42.8 45.9 45.8 46.2 46.2  –  30.1 37.3 50.8  –  –  –  – 
Belarus  BLR  22.9 23.3  –  34.1 39.9  –  24.6 24.1 24.7 24.5 24.1 24.1 24.3 24.5 23.8 24.8 23.8 32.1 
Georgia  GEO 28.0  29.1 – 36.9  40.0 –  –  – 49.8  50.3 –  – 48.7  46.6 –  – 40.8 – 
Kazakhstan  KAZ  28.1  – – –  32.7  – –  35.4  – – – – – –  35.9  37.0  42.0  41.4 
Kyrgyz  Republic  KGZ  27.0  –  –  30.0 44.5 44.3 39.5 42.8 43.1 38.4 35.8 37.5 36.4 35.9 35.2 38.0 39.3 39.7 
Moldova  MDA  25.1 26.7  –  41.1 43.7 37.9 39.0 41.4 46.4 42.6 44.1 43.7 43.5 43.6 41.1 42.2 43.0 38.5 
Russian  Federation  RUS  27.1 26.9 32.4 37.1 46.1 44.1 43.9 50.1  –  44.6  –  43.2 42.2 49.1  –  46.9 44.5 45.1 
Tajikistan  TJK  28.1  33.4  – – – – – – – –    47  – – –  32.5  33.6  – – 
Turkmenistan  TKM  27.9  30.8  – –  35.8  – – –  24.9  20.9  26.5  – – – – – – – 
Ukraine  UKR  22.8 24.0  –  25.1 36.4  –  47.0 41.3 40.6 39.1 32.0 36.3 36.4 32.7 40.8 41.0  –  41.0 





Bulgaria  BGR  23.3 21.2 26.2 30.9 31.6 35.3 36.8 34.5 34.4 32.1 30.9 30.8 31.4 34.2 32.2 35.8 33.8    31 
Czech  Republic  CZE  19.3 19.7 21.2 20.3 21.5 22.0 21.5 22.9 22.6 22.6 23.8 23.8 22.8 23.2 22.8 23.5 25.8 24.2 
Estonia  EST  28.0  –  –  –  34.0  –  39.8 35.5 36.2 36.3 35.7 36.7 35.4 35.5 35.0 38.3 36.1  – 
Hungary  HUN  21.3 29.3 20.3 30.5 22.6 23.0 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.3 23.7 25.0 25.7 24.6 25.2 27.4 27.9 26.2 
Latvia  LVA  26.0  –  24.7 33.3 28.3 32.5 34.6 34.9 31.5 33.0 31.8 35.0 32.2 34.1 35.9 39.1 36.0 39.0 
Lithuania  LTU  26.3  –  –  –  33.3 35.0 33.3 34.3 32.3 32.8 32.8 34.7 34.5 33.9 32.4 30.9 36.0 35.0 
Poland  POL  25.0 26.8 23.2 24.0 31.5 32.6 32.2 32.9 34.0 32.6 33.1 34.2 34.0 34.9 35.2 36.6 36.6 34.0 
Romania  ROM  23.3 22.9 24.3 25.2 26.2 26.2 31.1 30.5 30.2 29.4 28.7 30.3 35.3 34.9 35.2 35.9 36.1 36.4 
Slovak  Republic  SVK  20.0 21.6 23.3 24.5 23.0  –  –  24.6 23.2 25.6 24.0 24.3 26.2 26.0 25.5 25.4 26.0 24.2 




Albania  ALB  – – – – – – –  29.3  – – – – –  28.1  –  31.1  – – 
Bosnia  BIH  – –  32.9  – – – – – – – – –  26.0  – – –  35.8  – 
Croatia  HRV 36.0  27.1  26.7  27.5  26.5 –  –  – 24.6  30.4 –  – 31.0 – 29.0 – 29.0 – 
Macedonia  MKD  32.2 34.9 26.7 23.5 27.2 33.9 35.9 37.0 36.7 30.8 36.7 35.1 36.3 36.6 35.2 36.2 39.1 39.4 
Serbia &
Montenegro
* FRY  32.3 40.3 31.7 34.7 45.6 32.7 28.4 27.3 27.4 27.4 26.1 32.1 28.1 31.1 40.3 39.3 39.3 38.8 
Notes:
*Serbia only from 2002 onwards. NEUM: New EU Member Countries; FSR: Former Soviet Republics; WBK: Western Balkan Countries 
Source: WIID database Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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Table A2: List of Variables, Abbreviations and Sources 
Abbreviation Variable   Source 
Gini Gini  coefficient  WIID
Govshare  General government final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP  WDI
Agrshare  Value added of agriculture as a % of GDP  WDI
Inflation  Annual % change of the GDP deflator  WDI
Growth  Annual GDP growth in PPP, constant 2005 international $  WDI
LSP  Progress in Large Scale Privatization   EBRD 
SSP  Progress in Small Scale Privatization   EBRD 
GER  Progress in Governance and Enterprise Restructuring   EBRD 
PL  Progress in Price Liberalization   EBRD 
TFE  Progress in Trade and Foreign Exchange System   EBRD 
CP  Progress in Competition Policy   EBRD 
BR  Progress in Banking Reform and Interest Rate Liberalization   EBRD 
SFI  Progress in Securities Markets and Non-bank Financial Institutions   EBRD 
I  Progress in Infrastructure   EBRD 
EBRD  Unweighted average of the 9 EBRD transition indicators   EBRD 
War  Dummy variable, 1 if the country is at war in a given year and 0 otherwise   CSCW 
Dpers
Dummy variable, 1 if the survey calculated inequality with persons as units
of analysis and 0 if it used households 
WIID
Dearn
Dummy variable, 1 if the survey calculated inequality on the basis of earnings  
and 0 otherwise 
WIID
Dcons
Dummy variable, 1 if the survey calculated inequality on the basis of  
consumption and 0 otherwise 
WIID
Deqs
Dummy variable, 1 if the survey calculated inequality using an equivalence  
scale and 0 otherwise 
WIID
Dpop
Dummy variable, 1 if the survey calculated inequality on the whole population  
and 0 otherwise    WIID 
Notes:
WIID: World Income Inequality Database, United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economic Research 
WDI: World development Indicators, The World Bank 
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
CSCW: Centre for the Study of Civil War OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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Table A3: The Effect of Transition Reforms on Inequality (Restricted Sample, not  
Including Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina) 
Dynamic model  Dynamic model 
GMM-SYS GMM-SYS 












(–2.91) (–3.65) (–2.43) (–3.17) 
Growth(t–1) –  –  0.056 0.013 






(–2.60) (–2.73) (–5.21) (–3.19) 
Govshare(t–1) –  –  0.021 0.094 






(5.41) (4.46) (5.21) (4.66) 
Inflation –1.114
*** –0.808  –0.966
* –0.388 












(2.85) (2.66) (3.17) (4.13) 
EBRD




















*CL5 –  1.174 – 1.951
**
(1.36) (2.29)
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[joint  significance]  [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] 
Controls for survey differences  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of Obs.  259  259  244  244 
Wald  test  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
A-B AR(1) test  –3.39 –3.97 –3.87 –3.62 
[0.001] [0.0000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
A-B AR(2) test  0.20 0.29  –0.17  –0.40 
[0.838] [0.773] [0.865] [0.687] 
Sargan over-identification test  18.56 (13)  10.68 (11)  22.70 (16)  16.10 (15) 
  [0.137] [0.470] [0.122] [0.375] 
Notes:  
t statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets. 
A-B AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first- and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
* p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 Speed and Sequencing of Transition Reforms and Income Inequality 
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Figure A1: Transition Reforms Patterns by Country, EBRD Indicators (Selected Coun-
tries)
Poland  Hungary 
Russian Federation  Ukraine
Croatia  Macedonia OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG   Working Paper No. 302 
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